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Dealing with Recession and Inflation
THE PRESSURE for economic improvement, which
is now being felt everywhere in the world, has been a dom-
inant force throughout our nation's history. The typical Amer-
ican worker has not been content with a good income or
a decent standard of living. He has striven to improve his
skills, to increase his income, and to raise the standard of living
of his family. The typical business manager has not been con-
tent to run an efficient enterprise. He has striven to equip it
with the most modem contrivances, to improve its products or
services, and to expand sales. The typical investor has not been
content with a modest return on a safe investment. He has
willingly risked capital to create economic opportunity—by
exploring new processes, experimenting with new products,
building new facilities, and developing new markets. Our
economy has grown rapidly because we had faith in ourselves,
because we have developed institutions that encourage enter-
prise and reward efficiency, and because we have believed in
progress sufficiently to put enough aside from our current in-
come to expand the productive plant and build the knowledge
Millar Lecture at Fordham University, October 15, 1957. Reprinted, by
permission of the publisher, from Prosperity Without inflation, Fordham
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that would be needed by a venturesome and growing popula-
lion.
Americans today preponderantly believe in economic prog-
ress through free and competitive enterprise, just as our fathers
did. But we have also come to believe that progress need not
proceed as fitfully as in the past. Between 1854 and 1954 our
economy experienced twenty-four full waves of expansion fol-
lowed by contraction. Most of these setbacks to economic
growth were brief and mild. However, some were severe, as in
1857—58 and 1907—OS, and others were protracted as well as
severe,, as in the 1870's, the 1890's, and the 1930's. Whenever
an economic depression developed, people generously shared
what they had with their less fortunate neighbors. Private
welfare agencies supplemented these personal efforts by dis-
tributing provisions to the needy, and local governments oc-
casionally provided work relief. Such measures, however,
failed to reach many needing assistance. Sometimes they
added to the feeling of degradation produced by unemploy-
ment itself; and they did nothing to prevent the occurrence of
economic slumps. They could not long satisfy the requirements
of a society which, in the process of undergoing rapid industri-
alization, was also learning how to express its aspirations for a
better life through the ballot boxes of democracy.
I
The concept of governmental responsibility for moderating
economic fluctuations developed gradually and in response to
hard experience. At the beginning of the century, public offi-
cials were already searching for ways of dealing with the most
dramatic phase of the business cycic—that is, the prevention of
financial crises such as had occurred in 1893 and in 1907. The
violent movements of the price level between 1914 and 1921Dealing with Recession and Inflation131
stimulatedthe authorities of our newly organized Federal Re-
serve System to concern themselves during the twenties with
the moderation of price fluctuations, in the hope that the busi-
ness cycle itself might to some degree be tamed in the process.
After the stock market crash of 1929, business activity kept de-
clining for many months, unemployment reached proportions
hitherto unexperienced, and general discontent mounted. Ex-
tensive governmental measures to stimulate recovery of em-
ployment, production, and prices became unavoidable. They
were put in motion, first under the Hoover Administration,
later—and on a broader scale—by the Roosevelt Administra-
lion.
Unemployment finally vanished during World War II, but
the memory of its ravages during the thirties remained vivid. As
the war approached a close, great apprehension was felt that
mass unemployment might return once millions of men were
released by the armed forces and by the civilian establishments
then engaged in producing war goods. To register the nation's
determination that this must not happen, the Congress passed
with an overwhelming vote of the members of both our major
parties the Employment Act of 1946, which solemnly declared
that the federal government has a continuing responsibility to
use all practicable means to foster free competitive enterprise,
to prevent or moderate economic fluctuations, and to promote
maximum employment, production, and purchasing power.
The Employment Act reflects a revolutionary change in eco-
nomic and political thought. Only a generation ago, men con-
cerned with economic aft airs typically held the view that it was
best to allow storms of business depression to blow themselves
out. They knew, of course, that unemployment and business
failures at times increased sharply. They deplored such devel-
opments, and therefore persistently argued for monetary sta-
bility and the prevention of booms. But once a business reces-132The Business Cycle in a Changing World
sion got under way, they were inclined to oppose any large
governmental efforts to check the economic decline. In re-
sponse to such proposals, they often took the position that eco-
nomic adversity stimulated people to practice thrift and indus-
try, that it served to redirect or weed out inefficient workmen
and inefficient enterprises, and that economic progress was fur-
thered in the process. Let the government raise enough taxes
to cover its expenditures, let the banks maintain pressure on
business firms to liquidate excessive inventories and avoid
hazardous undertakings, let the financially weak firms take
down theft shingles and put up their shutters, let the general
public practice greater frugality—incredible though it may
now seem, these were the measures for curing a business de-
pression that were widely and effectively advanced a mere
twenty or thirty years ago.
The Great Depression of the thirties and the international
troubles of later years forced most of us to reexamine our eco-
nomic ideas. From personal observation or experience we have
learned that self-reliant workers as well as the shiftless lose
their jobs when business activity falls off appreciably, and that
at such a time well-managed enterprises often follow the ineffi-
cient into bankruptcy. We have learned that in the course of a
depression many men lose faith in themselves, and that some
lose faith even in our economic and political institutions. We
have learned that economic progress is a powerful weapon in
the ideological struggle that of late has been stirring men's
minds in distant lands, and that the continuance of prosperity
is our best answer to the Marxist prophecy of crisis and col-
lapse of free economies. We have come to recognize that in an
age of international turmoil such as ours, federal tax revenues,
expenditures, and debt transactions are bound to be very large,
and that it therefore is unrealistic to suppose that the govern-Dealing with Recession and Inflation133
mentany longer either can or should be a neutral factor in the
economy.
Although our ability to limit recessions and prevent depres-
sions has not yet been fully tested, we have made considerable
progress in understanding economic fluctuations and we have
learned to profit from the mistakes of the past. No government
nowadays would tolerate the destruction of one-third of the
nation's money supply during a period of depressed economic
activity and prices. Yet that is precisely what happened be-
tween the fall of 1929 and the spring of 1933. No monetary au-
thority is likely to repeat in the near future the blunder of the
Federal Reserve System in the autumn of 1931 when, in the
face of widespread economic fear and trouble, a tightening of
credit was allowed to occur. Nor has the ineffectiveness of the
liberalizing actions that followed in early 1932 escaped the at-
tention of experienced observers. It is not enough to increase
the availability and reduce the cost of credit during the declin-
ing phase of a business cycle. If such action is to be effective, it
must come when the level of business and consumer confi-
dence is high. This condition is much more likely to prevail in
the early than in the advanced stage of a business contraction,
particularly if the government pursues policies that otherwise
encourage individual enterprise.
If prosperity is to flourish, people must have confidence in
their own economic future and that of their country. This basic
truth was temporarily lost sight of during the 1930's in the
process of grafting new economic ideas and practices onto the
old. In the five years from 1932 to 1936, unemployment at its
lowest was nine million or 17 per cent of the labor force; at its
highest it was thirteen million or 25 per cent of the labor force.
The existence of such vast unemployment did not, however,
deter the federal government from imposing new tax burdens.134The Business Cycle in a Changing World
Exemptions under the individual income tax were lowered
from $3,500 to $2,500formarried persons. The minimum rate
of the tax was raised from 1.5 to 4 per cent, and the maximum
rate from 25 to 79 per cent. The exemption of dividends from
the normal taxwasrepealed. The tax rate on capital gains of
high income recipients was increased. The basic tax rate on
corporate profits was raised from 12 to 15 per cent, besides the
levying of a capital stock tax. An undistributed profits tax was
imposed, with a maximum rate of 27 per cent. The exemption
under the estate tax was sharply reduced, while the maximum
rate of the tax was raised from 20 to 70 per cent. A new gift tax
was enacted, with a maximum rate of 52½ per cent. A wide
variety of new excise taxes was imposed—on automobiles and
parts, cameras, phonograph records, sporting goods,furs,
jewelry, radios, refrigerators, gasoline, electrical energy, tele-
phone and telegraph messages, and toilet preparations. For a
time, even candy, chewing gum, and soft drinks carried ex-
cises, as did checks drawn on bank accounts.
The Revenue Act of 1932 imposed the heaviest of these in-
creases of taxation, but later legislation added new burdens in
quick succession—in 1934, 1935, and again in 1936. People
were unprepared for tax measures of such severity. The new
taxes encroached on the spending power of both consumers
and business firms at a time when production and employment
were seriously depressed. Worse still, they spread fear that the
tax system was becoming an instrument for redistributing in-
comes, if not also for punishing success. Greatly increased fed-
eral spending and borrowing, which accompanied the new and
higher taxes, stirred further doubt in the minds of many busi-
nessmen and investors about the country's economic future. In
the prevailing atmosphere of uncertainty, much of the con-
structive legislation of the time—as in the case of banking, theDealing with Recession and Inflation135
stockmarket, housing, public utilities, and social security—was
poorly understood and likewise viewed with suspicion. Innova-
tion and investment therefore languished. The effectiveness of
the government's extensive recovery program was reduced. Al-
though economic conditions on the whole improved, business
remained sluggish and the unemployed still numbered over
eight million as late as 1940.
From the storm and stress of the 1930's our economy has
been able, however, to draw new strength in more recent
years. The insurance of bank deposits and of savings and loan
accounts, the long-term amortizable and insured mortgage, an-
employment insurance, and tax revenues that respond sensi-
tively to changes in the national income—all these automatic
devices for curbing the rapidity with which a recession cumu-
lates are an inheritance from that decade. More important still
is the emergence of an attitude of mind which refuses to ac-
cept passively the antics of the business cycle or ways of deal-
ing with recession that have been fried and found wanting.
The present generation looks to the government for leader-
ship in reducing economic instability; and the basis for this
confidence has been improving. To be sure, if the business or
consuming public chooses to speculate widely in inventories, a
general curtailment of production is bound to follow sooner or
later. Or if plant expansion proceeds with great rapidity in
many lines of activity at the same time, a temporary condition
of overcapacity may easily develop and require correction. Nor
are these the only developments that can cause general eco-
nomic activity to contract. The essential objective, however, is
not to prevent all contractions, but rather to maintain an en-
vironment that curbs excesses from which recessions often
spring and to keep such recessions as do occur from degenerat-
ing into severe depressions. Recent history indicates that our136The Business Cycle in a Changing World
public policies can be shaped so as to powerfully promote this
broad objective.
II
In contrast to earlier generations, which stressed developments
in financial and commodity markets, the modem tendency is to
think of business recessions largely in terms of unemployment.
Of course, not all of the unemployment that exists in our dy-
namic society is a grave social evil or problem. Some unem-
ployment reflects the fluctuations of the seasons or the frictions
of the labor market, where the search of enterprising men
and women for better work opportunities is always important.
This minimum of unemployment is practically irreducible over
any short period, although not in the long run. No good mea-
sure of it is available, but in recent years economists have
commonly taken it to be something like 4 per cent of our labor
force. In other words, a condition of practically full employ-
ment is believed to exist when the unemployment rate is about
4 per cent or smaller. In our latest encounter with recession,
however, the government did not allow this crude yardstick or
any other convention to get in the way of prompt counter-
cyclical action.
When economic clouds began to gather in the late spring of
1953, the government was alert to the possible danger of de-
pression. A sizable accumulation of inventories by retailers and
wholesalers was one of the first visible signs of impending
trouble. A decline in the length of the work week in manufac-
turing was another. By mid-year it became clear that the build-
up of stocks had been involuntary. Retail sales were sluggish,
business expenditures on inventories began declining, and
these developments were soon aggravated by the drop of mill-
taiy spending which followed the cessation of hostilities inDealing with Recession andInflation137
Korea.The efforts of businessmen to adjust inventories to cur-
rent sales led to some reduction in output, and so too did the
decline of governmental expenditure, particularly for defense
outlays. In consequence, employment fell off appreciably in
manufacturing industries, and to some degree in other parts of
the economy. But the depression that many feared or expected
did not develop.
En its new role of responsibility for the maintenance of the
nations's prosperity, the federal government deliberately took
speedy and massive actions to build confidence and pave the
way for renewed economic growth. In May 1953, the Federal
Reserve System moved to ease credit conditions by embarking
on extensive purchases of securities in the open market. In late
June and early July, a bolder step was taken, namely, the re-
serve requirements of member banks were reduced. This shift
to a policy of credit ease was made before economic activity,
viewed in the aggregate, had begun declining. In September,
the Secretary of the Treasury removed any doubt about early
tax cuts by announcing that the Administration would relin-
quish the excess profits tax and accept a reduction of the per-
sonal income tax, both of which were scheduled by earlier leg-
islation for the end of the year. This unequivocal declaration of
tax policy, like the earlier moves in the credit sphere, was
made when the reported rate of unemployment was less than
2½ per cent. By January 1954, when the President submitted
his Economic Report to the Congress, economic activity had
already been receding for six months. The latest figure of un-
employment then stood at 3 per cent. New and revised statis-
tics which showed more serious deterioration were not as yet
available. But, anticipating some extension of the economic de-
cline, the Economic Report counseled the Congress that it
"makes a vital difference whether an unemployment rate of 3
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it," and that "prudence as well as zeal for economic improve-
ment require that public policy contribute both to the immedi-
ate strength of the economy and to its long-term growth."
The President therefore recommended a broad program of
legislation. High on the list were tax proposals which, besides
correcting various personal inequities, would serve to stimulate
business enterprise—through liberalized depreciation allow-
ances on new investments, through fuller treatment of research
and development outlays as current expenses, through partial
tax credits to recipients of dividends for the income taxes al-
ready paid by corporations, and through the extension of the
carryback of losses in reckoning income for tax purposes.
These reforms of the tax structure were intended to supple-
ment the removal of the corporate excess profits tax and the re-
duction of the personal income tax averaging about 10 per
cent for most taxpayers, which had just become effective. The
President also requested legislation to expand the scope and
raise the benefits provided by the old-age and unemployment
insurance systems, to extend and liberalize credit facilities for
home ownership, to foster more energetically the clearance of
slums and the rehabilitation of blighted neighborhoods, and to
improve the nation's highways. Over the next few months the
Congress largely adopted the President's recommendations. It
also added a sizable cut in excise levies which, even after al-
lowing for an increase of 1.3 billion dollars in social security
contributions, brought the various tax reductions for individu-
als and businesses that became effective in 1954 to the huge
figure of 6.1 billion dollars on a full-year basis.
These major steps to create an atmosphere favorable to the
resumption of economic growth were reinforced by other ac-
lions, largely of an administrative character. The Federal Re-
serve authorities lowered the discount rate early in 1954 and
later again reduced the reserve requirements of memberDealing with Recession and Inflation139
banks.Governmental aid was projected for some hard-pressed
industries—notably, to shipbuilding through a new construc-
lion program, and to zinc and lead mining through a revised
stockpiling program. Some effort was made to assist hard-
pressed localities by channeling government contracts to them
and by boosting the allowable rate of accelerated amortization
on such industrial investments in these areas as served to
strengthen the nation's defense base. The ordinary housekeep-
ing activities of government were managed with an eye to the
immediate needs of the economy. For example, the Veterans
Administration speeded up the processing of loan guaranty ap-
plications, the Federal Housing Administration did likewise
with applications for loan insurance, the Department of Agri-
culture expedited arrangements to stimulate private construc-
lion of grain elevators, the Internal Revenue Service made ad-
vance payments to taxpayers who had been overassessed prior
to final determination of the overassessment, the Bureau of
Public Roads lost no time in implementing its expanded finan-
cial authority, and so on from one governmental bureau to
another. Beyond these housekeeping steps, the Administration
sought to check the decline in governmental spending, which
in the case of the Defense Department had gone considerably
further in the first half of 1954 than had been either planned or
anticipated. A modest rescheduling of expenditure within the
total set for fiscal year 1955 was adopted, with a view to rais-
ing somewhat the government's planned spending for the first
six months of the year and thus reinforcing the processes of
economic recovery which, while already visible on numerous
fronts, were as yet of uncertain strength.
These actions to curb the decline of economic activity did
not express the unfolding of any master plan in which all de-
tails had been worked out in advance and every contingency
provided for. Not only is this sort of thing practically impossi-140The Business Cycle in a Changing World
ble, but any determined attempt to realize it could invite disas-
ter. No two recessions ever run the same course; unforeseen
developments are bound to occur; and measures that work
well in one situation may work badly in another. A wise gov-
ernment will therefore seek to maintain flexibility in its ap-
proach and be prepared to do more in one direction and less in
another, besides trying new measures. It will not entrust the
nation's fate to a categorical economic forecast or to a rigid
economic program.
There are, however, major principles suggested by experi-
ence that can usefully guide governmental efforts to check a
recession. The first principle is that when the economy shows
signs of faltering, prompt countermoves are required. Even
mild measures on the part of government can be effective in
the early stages of an economic decline. On the other hand, if
action is withheld until a recession has gathered momentum,
strong and costly measures may prove insufficient. Second,
efforts to check a recession have to be coordinated, so that the
steps taken by different agencies of our far-flung government
may reinforce one another. Third, as far as possible every item
of legislation or administrative action, whether it be of short-
or long-range character, should encourage consumers and
business firms to look with hope and confidence to theft own
and theft country's economic future. Fourth, the actions taken
should be on a sufficient scale to give reasonable promise of
checking the recession, yet not so powerful as to stimulate ex-
tensive speculation or other excesses that may create trouble
later. Fifth, while monetary, fiscal, and general housekeeping
measures must to some degree go together, they need to be
spaced so as to give the private economy a reasonable oppor-
tunity to carry out necessary adjustments and to muster its
latent strength. Sixth, and by way of partial corollary from the
three preceding principles) the emphasis at the start of a reces-Dealing with Recession and Inflation141
sionshould ordinarily be on the easing of credit conditions,
later on tax reductions for both individuals and businesses, still
later on rescheduling of federal expenditure within totals set
by long-term considerations, and—only as a last resort—on
large public works programs. Of course, advance planning is
essential, if public works expenditures are to be accelerated
when they may be urgently needed to bolster the economy and
if they are to be concentrated, as they should be, on projects
that can be completed in relatively short periods and that will
serve to support rather than to restrict the opportunities for
private enterprise. Seventh, since no two recessions are alike
and since they occur under different circumstances in a na-
tion's life, the policies of government must be sensitively ad-
justed to the individual case. Thus, international factors and
considerations of national security may at times justify giving
early and preponderant emphasis to expansion of governmen-
tal expenditure.
These are the broad principles that guided governmental
thought and policies during the recession of 1953—54 and im-
parted a certain unity and strength to the government's
individual actions. That, of course, does not mean that all the
measures taken proved fruitful. For example, the program for
aiding depressed localities accomplished little beyond demon-
strating a need for stronger or at least different measures.
Again, the rescheduling of expenditures for the fiscal year 1955
was delayed in execution and became effective when it was no
longer needed. But the program as a whole worked out reason-
ably well. A crash program such as many urged at the time
was avoided. Governmental enterprises were kept from multi-
plying. Yet the contraction in economic activity never reached
serious proportions and lasted only a year. At its lowest point,
employment in nonagricultural establishments was only 3½
per cent below the preceding peak. Personal income declined142The Business Cycle in a Changing World
still less, while disposable income—that is, personal income
after taxes—defied the recession by actually increasing.
Natural forces of economic recovery, the continuance of
prosperity abroad, and the safeguards provided by earlier
legislation—all had a part in this outcome and in the great
economic advance that followed. But the government also
played its part. It did not leave the fate of the economy to the
automatic stabilizers or to good fortune. It intervened actively
and its measures proved effective—in large part because they
were disciplined by general principles which had roots in expe-
rience and therefore commanded wide assent both within and
outside the government.
III
We began to make progress as a people in solving the problem
of depression only after we became su.fflciently aroused to seek
workable solutions. In recent years, many citizens have come
to feel that we have been preoccupied with the need to pre-
vent the miseries of depression, when in fact that matter was
already being handled fairly well, while we have slighted the
injustice and hardships that flow from inflation, when in fact
these have been multiplying for a generation. Concern over in-
flation has been increasing. It has not yet become articulate
enough to wring from the Congress a declaration of policy that
would have a moral force such as the Employment Act exer-
cises with regard to unemployment. On the other hand, any re-
turn to the pegging of yields on government securities, which
contributed materially to the sharp rise in the general price
level during the years immediately after the war, has today be-
come almost unthinkable. With increased understanding of
the need to curb inflation, the classical remedies for inflation—
credit restraints and a balanced budget—are again in good re-Dealing with Recession and Inflation143
puteand have of late been diligently applied. These are con
siderable advances. They have surely helped to keep the rise
of the consumer price level since 1954 within moderate bounds.
But just as surely they have not sufficed to stop inflation.
The application of credit restraints began early in the new
expansion. Government officials knew that the measures that
had been taken during 1953 and 1954 to build confidence, par-
ticularly the actions taken with regard to credit and taxes,
carried the risk of exciting overconfidence and subsequent
reaction. Already in the closing months of 1954 the sharp rise
of stock prices and the financial methods used by builders to
push sales of new homes caused some concern. Signs of specu-
lation multiplied during the early months of 1955 as expansion
of both credit and economic activity proceeded rapidly and on
a widening front. Therefore, starling in January 1955, the gov-
ernment adopted one measure after another with a view to
checking economic exuberance.
Although the demand for bank loans was abnormally high,
the Federal Reserve authorities reduced their holdings of gov-
ernment securities, as they usually do in the early months of
the year. Commercial banks therefore found it necessary to sell
government securities or borrow at the Federal Reserve Banks
to maintain their lending. The Federal Reserve authorities also
raised stock margin requirements and the discount rate. The
Treasury decided to tap the long-term capital market and put
out a substantial issue of forty-year bonds. The Federal Hous-
ing Administration and the Veterans Administration reduced
the maximum maturity and raised the minimum down pay-
ment on governmentally underwritten mortgages. Both agen-
cies also put an end to the occasional but highly dubious
practice of including the closing costs on the purchase of a
home in the face value of underwritten mortgages. The Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board imposed limits on lending by the144TheBusiness Cycle in a Changing Work!
Home Loan Banks to savings and loan associations. Covern-
ment officials warned lenders that their progressively more
liberal terms for financing instalment sales of automobiles were
fraught with danger; and, to emphasize the government's con-
cern, the several bank supervisory authorities added a section
on consumer credit to their regular examination forms. These
and related actions to restrain credit expansion were all taken
by the late summer of 1955. In the meantime, the clamor to
reduce taxes was successfully resisted, and the fiscal year 1955
ended with federal expenditures 3.2 billion dollars below fiscal
1954 on an administrative basis and 1.4 billion below on a cash
basis.
Thus, as this recital indicates, the government moved rather
promptly to curb the inflationary forces that gathered during
1955. Moreover, the effort to restrain general credit expansion
has since then been continued unremittingly. The discount rate
was raised lime and again. Pressure on the reserves of com-
mercial banks became more intense. As a result many people
found it harder to obtain loans, and credit became more costly
than it has been in a long generation. Nor were the restrictive
measures taken by the government confined to monetary ac-
lions. In 1955 the stockpiling program was adjusted within the
limits permitted by law and defense requirements, so as to re-
lieve the shortages of vital materials felt by the civilian econ-
omy. Earlier plans to finance the new Interstate Highway Pro-
gram by borrowing were abandoned in 1956, and additional
taxes on gasoline and other automotive products were enacted
to make this program self-financing. Proposals to cut tax rates
continued to be resisted successfully. And the higher tax reve-
nues, which the advance of prosperity kept generating, permit-
ted a modest reduction of the federal debt in fiscal year 1956
and again in fiscal 1957, despite the recent increase of federal
expenditures.Dealing with Recession and Inflation145
Thisis an impressive record. All the same, when governmen-
tal policies are viewed in their entirety, it is clear that the
efforts to resist the inflationary pressures that developed after
1954 neither ranged as widely nor carried as much weight as
the measures that had previously been adopted to resist reces-
sion. Nothing that was done to curb inflation matched the
dramatic tax cuts of 1954 or the reduction in bank reserve re-
quirements of both that year and the preceding year. No gen-
eral increase in taxation was enacted by the Congress. No in-
crease in reserve requirements was ever ordered by the
Federal Reserve authorities. No issue of long-term bonds was
put out by the Treasury between the summer of 1955 and the
fall of 1957. The lifting of the discount rate was carried out in
a series of small steps. The increase of minimum down pay-
ments in connection with federally underwritten mortgages
came merely to 2 per cent of the purchase price. Even the se-
curity holdings of the Federal Reserve System had their ups as
well as their downs, and they were practically as large at the
end of 1956 as at the end of 1954.
Beyond this, the restrictive measures taken by the govern-
ment were accompanied by other actions of an expansive
character which culminated in 1956—a year during which
wholesale prices rose sharply while consumer prices also re-
sumed their advance. Increases in the pay of federal employ-
ees were enacted in 1955 and became effective in July of that
year. An increase in the hourly minimum wage from 75 cents
to a dollar became effective in March 1956, increasing directly
the wages of two million workers in private industry. Price
support levels for various agricultural crops were raised in
1956. Special export programs for agricultural products were
pushed energetically. A new Soil Bank Program was enacted
and government purchases for the school lunch and related
programs were increased. Lending by the Small Business Ad-146TheBusiness Cycle in a Changing World
ministration was stepped up. Various of the special restrictions
on housing credit that had been adopted during 1955 were
either relaxed or dropped, and massive support of the mort-
gage market was extended by the Federal National Mortgage
Association. The old-age insurance program was liberalized,
with effects on the flow of incomes that were delayed, how-
ever, until 1957. Expenditures increased in connection with
numerous other programs. Between July 1956 and July 1957,
total federal expenditures on a cash basis rose 7.4 billion dol-
lars over the preceding fiscal year, while cash receipts rose
only 5.1 billion. In consequence, the cash surplus declined
from 4.5 to 2.1 billion dollars.
Viewed individually, many—if not all—of the expansive ac-
tions taken by government during 1955 and 1956 were meri-
torious in high degree. They were inspired partly by considera-
tions of the national defense, and partly by the concern with
people's welfare which must go hand in hand with the en-
couragement of private enterprise in our times. With the
nation's prosperity increasing, it seemed only natural to take
some constructive steps in behalf of the sectors of our economy
that had failed to participate in the nation's general progress or
that felt the impact of credit restraints most severely. With
wages rising rapidly in the private economy, it seemed only
prudent to raise the pay of governmental employees. With tax
revenues growing abundantly, it seemed only proper to use a
portion of the increased wherewithal to reduce somewhat the
outstanding public debt, and yet leave enough to increase de-
fense outlays and expand other programs that seemed essential
or socially desirable. All this was done. The increase in federal
expenditures thus helped to swell the nation's aggregate mone-
tary demand at a time when physical resources were already
being strained by the rising demands of business firms, con-
sumers, and state and local governments, many of whom alsoDealing with Recession and Inflation147
felt that their augmented spending was only natural, prudent,
and proper. With the economic community at large, including
the several levels of government, striving to add to consump-
lion or to capital investment more quickly than the nation's
workshops could add to production, some advance of both the
wholesale and consumer price level became unavoidable.
It is true that federal spending increased much less rapidly
than did the nation's total expenditure after 1954. It may justly
be held, however, that there was a need for special restraint on
the government's part at a time when the rest of the economy
was displaying extreme exuberance. In the process of raising
its expenditures and taking other expansive actions, particu-
larly with regard to agriculture and wages, the policy of the
federal government for containing inHation came to rest in-
creasingly on the general credit restraints administered by the
Federal Reserve System. This was a heavier burden than our
monetary authorities could of themselves properly handle.
Iv
The American people are nowadays broadly united on major
goals of economic policy—a high and stable rate of employ-
ment in relation to the labor force, expanding production, im-
provement in living standards, and a reasonably stable con-
sumer price level. The federal government has sought to
promote these objectives. It has done this with increasing un-
derstanding that prosperity cannot be ordered or guaranteed
by government officials.
A nation's prosperity rests fundamentally on the enterprise
of individuals seeking to better themselves, theft families, and
their communities. It depends far more on what individuals do
for themselves than on what the government does or can do
for them. The government may, however, significantly influ-148TheBusiness Cycle in a Changing World
ence the course of our economy by pursuing policies that stim-
ulate private citizens to act in ways which will tend to sustain
prosperity. Considerable success has attended governmental
efforts in recent years to maintain an environment that favors
higher production, expanding employment, and rising living
standards. The purchasing power of the consumer's dollar has
not, however, been maintained. It is true that the rise in the
price level that has occurred since 1954 is moderate by histori-
cal standards. However, in view of the rigidity which of late
has characterized the wage level and only to a lesser degree
the price level during economic contractions,still greater
moderation of price advances must be sought during economic
expansions in order to prevent a creeping type of inflation in
the future.
Although governmental resistance to inflation has signifi-
cantly stiffened of late, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion
that the government is not yet prepared to act as decisively to
check inflation as it is to check recession. In the event of a re-
cession, the general attitude of government is apt to be that
everything which is at all reasonable must be done without
much delay, and that if inflationary pressures develop later as
a result of the stimulants that are applied, they will be dealt
with in due course. On the other hand, once inflationary pres-
sures emerge, the government is unlikely to proceed in the
spirit that if a recession develops as a result of its restrictive
measures, that difficulty in turn will be dealt with in good sea-
son. Rather, the attitude is apt to be that, 'while everything
which is at all reasonable must be done to curb inflation, re-
strictive policies must not be applied on so vigorous a scale as
to take any appreciable chance of bringing on or hastening a
recession.
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slight, is probably unavoidable in the existing state of public
opinion. While the government has the broad responsibility of
leading the nation along sound economic channels, no Admin-
istration that is too far removed from the prevailing sentiments
of the people can long continue to govern. When a threat of
unemployment develops, a clamor for governmental interven-
tion comes from all directions. On the other hand, when the
price level begins rising, pressures for governmental action are
less insistent. Not only that, but governmental steps to curb in-
flation are sure to be loudly resisted by many, while measures
to curb unemployment are just as sure to be applauded in most
quarters. There can be little doubt that although people gener-
ally and genuinely wish the consumer price level to remain
reasonably stable, they also fear depression more than they
fear inflation. The catastrophe of the 1930's is still fresh in our
memories and the sort of inflation that we have had is rightly
viewed as the lesser evil by comparison.
Our economic and political environment, however, has been
radically transformed over the past quarter century. Serious
depressions are no longer the threat they once were, while
creeping inflation has become a chronic feature of recent his-
tory and a growing threat to the welfare of millions of people.
Not only is a creeping inflation unnecessary to the continuance
of prosperity, but it can in time become a grave obstacle to it
—either because the inflation may get out of hand or because,
if inflation should continue for many years its gradual inroads
on the pocketbooks of people, their concern over inflation may
mount to a point where they will be unwilling in the event of a
recession to support any large governmental efforts to hasten
recovery. These considerations are better understood today
than they were only a few years ago. But they are not yet un-
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as yet developed the same sense of justice toward the sufferers
from inflation that they have come to feel with regard to the
sufferers from unemployment.
If we are to make better progress in dealing with inflation,
the first requirement therefore is better and wider public un-
derstanding of the need for a solution. But we must also recog-
nize the shortcomings of our recent public policies and try to
improve upon them. However necessary and helpful a bal-
anced budget and a restrictive monetary policy may be in the
age-old struggle against inflation, it is doubtful whether they
alone can cope with the threat of creeping inflation.